Greece

The two percentage-point gaps for Greece are shown next to the unweighted mean across settings. Both are defined as female minus male. A negative choice gap means that among students who have already cleared the same academic bar, women are less likely than men to rank a STEM program first.

The table summarizes features of the admission system that bear on the construction and interpretation of the analysis. Untranscribed values are marked as pending.

Most tertiary education institutions in Greece are public and admit students through a single centralized system. Students are assigned to tertiary education places by a deferred acceptance algorithm that takes into account performance on the national college admission examination (the Panhellenic Examinations, PE), student preferences, and affirmative action status. Well in advance of the examination, the Ministry of Education publishes the number of places in each college-major and the subject weights assigned to different parts of the PE, so the terms of competition are known before students sit the exam.

Ranked lists have no numerical limit, but the choice set is gated: students may apply to at most two of the five broad subject categories into which college majors are divided, a choice made before ranking programs within them. In practice this confines an applicant to about 350 choices out of roughly 600 available. The paper's Data section flags this as a categorical gate, one of only two among the ten settings (the other is Uganda's A-level subject requirement): part of what the submitted list measures as choice is a domain decision taken before the list is written. Greece sits mid-range on the choice gap, so this restriction is not generating the cross-setting pattern the paper reports.

Assignment produces a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. A student who declines the offer, or who receives none, can retake the examination the following year at no financial cost. Alternatively, a student may retain the first PE score and reuse it the following year, in which case they compete only against other students who also chose to defer their entrance rather than with the main cohort. Affirmative action operates through reserved places: a pre-specified proportion of college places is set aside for specific sub-groups, whose members compete only with other students holding the same status; around 5% of applicants are affected.

The calendar runs examination first, application second. The Ministry of Education publishes program capacities and the PE subject weights well in advance of the examination. Students sit the Panhellenic Examinations in May and June; the PE consists of six to nine papers, centrally set and centrally graded.

After receiving their results, students submit their application forms with ranked preferences in early August. Scores are therefore known when the list is submitted, so the list can respond to where the student actually stands. Each student then receives a single take-it-or-leave-it offer; a student who declines it, or who receives no offer, can sit the examination again the following year at no financial cost, or carry the first score forward into the deferred pool.

All 41 institutions in the system admit through the centralized platform. Greece is one of three settings in the paper, with Australia and Sweden, where centralized admissions cover every university, so there is no selective outside option to document. Applicants choose among about 609 college-major programs in a typical year.

Most tertiary institutions in Greece are public. A number of private universities operate a fully decentralized admission system outside the platform, but graduates of private institutions do not yet have equal degree recognition rights with graduates of public institutions within Greece. There is no tuition fee among participating institutions, and financial aid is available.

The performance measure is the final Panhellenic Examinations score. The PE consists of six to nine centrally set and centrally graded papers, and the subject weights applied to its different parts are published by the Ministry of Education in advance; the data record each student's final PE score.

Performance groups are formed within setting and cohort over the full distribution of score holders, 680,035 students across the 2003–2012 cohorts. The measure is constructed identically for women and men; no admission adjustment, weighting, or bonus enters it.

The Greek data are reported by decile and by top 5%, so some thresholds used elsewhere in the paper cannot be formed here. In particular, a top-1% group cannot be constructed, and Greece is the one setting of the ten missing from the top-1% results.

The data cover the 2003–2012 application cohorts, the earliest window among the paper's ten settings, and include the universe of applicants: 680,035 score holders in total, the full distribution against which performance groups are defined. Women are 55.8% of all applicants. The top decile contains 68,007 students, 41,523 women and 26,484 men, so women are 61.1% of the high-achieving group; the pipeline gap runs in women's favor in this setting.

The analysis focuses on first-time applicants. Students who decline their offer or receive none may retake the examination the following year, and students who defer with a retained score compete in a separate pool rather than with the main cohort, so restricting to first-time applicants keeps each cohort's sample to students competing in the main allocation.

Two coverage limits are documented. Counts for business and law are available only for the top 5%, so Greece is absent from those columns of the paper's cross-field decomposition and is marked n/a in the top-10% and top-20% panels of the corresponding figures; its STEM and health counts are complete. And because the data are reported by decile and by top 5%, the top-1% group cannot be formed for Greece.

Additional record-level exclusions and field mappings are documented in the replication code.

Admission rules in this setting do not differ by sex: the paper's Table A.III comparison of the ten systems records no sex-conditional admission rule for Greece, and the PE score on which students are ranked is constructed identically for women and men, with no adjustment, weighting, or bonus. The system's affirmative-action reserves apply to specific sub-groups affecting around 5% of applicants, and no sex-differentiated rule is documented in the sources. Eligibility otherwise runs through academic performance, with the one qualification stated in the paper's Data section: the two-of-five subject-category gate means a domain choice precedes ranking, but that gate is not conditioned on sex.

The records are supplied and maintained by the Ministry of Education and cover the universe of applicants for the 2003–2012 cohorts. For each student, they contain the full set of choice lists, the final Panhellenic Examinations score, the student's gender, and the high school attended. From the Ministry of Finance, the project obtained a measure of average household income at the postcode level for the year 2009, matched to the location of each student's high school.

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